Postgrowth and Class Conflict
Miriam Meissner
Invited comment on Matthias Schmelzer’s lecture ”Socio-ecological transformation conflicts and the meaning of economic growth”, Marc Bloch Center, Berlin, December 16, 2024.
In 2020, in the midst of the coronavirus pandemic, Dutch historian Rutger Bregman proclaimed: The neoliberal era is over – what’s next?
At the moment, it seems to me, fascism is coming next. Or, as some define it, post-fascism: far-right political movements that take up the frustrations and fears of the masses and turn them into hatred and resentment. Anger at the bureaucrats up there. Hatred of refugees. Resentment against academic elites and their woke students.
But where does this frustration, which the right is mobilizing for itself, come from?
Some claim that this is primarily about economic performance. Rising prices. Too little growth. A climate policy that harms industry. A nation that is losing power and status in international comparison.
But is economic growth really the antidote to the frustration of the masses?
This is contradicted by the fact that right-wing extremist movements are also – and sometimes especially – strong where economic performance is relatively high in terms of Gross Domestic Product. The USA, Sweden, the Netherlands, France, Germany, and so on.
A strong economy currently doesn’t guarantee a happy society.
So we need to go deeper. And this is exactly what the new study by Matthias Schmelzer, Dennis Eversberg, Martin Fritz and Linda von Faber does.
As we know, socio-ecological change is a controversial topic. Some people want this change at all costs and for good reasons. Others fear this change. They feel its necessity is exaggerated. Consider those who advocate socio-ecological change as urban elites. Here in the Netherlands, these are seen as “oat milk elites”; those who can afford green.
And even among those who want change, there is disagreement. Some want technology and “green growth” above all else. Business as usual – only smarter, with lots of hydrogen, lithium batteries, and so on. Others, on the other hand, not only want a techno-transition, but also a social transition. Rethink common wellbeing. Redistribute. Public luxury and private sufficiency.
Where do these different views come from? What their research impressively shows here is that it is not a matter of random differences of opinion and interests. Rather, these differences in opinion and interests coincide with characteristics such as income and education, urban versus rural residence, and much more. The resulting groupings are instinctively familiar to many of us.
What their study now proves is that lines of conflict are often misinterpreted and distorted in our current debate on socio-ecological change.
First of all, we as a society are not split into two poles, but rather fragmented. That is an important insight.
Furthermore, their study shows that what is often portrayed as a difference in values and lifestyle is not just that. If certain values cluster in certain occupational or income groups, then it is not just a matter of conflicts of values and interests, but also of class conflicts.
But we don’t talk much about class in Germany – at least not yet. One dimension of class conflict that I particularly miss is the conflict between those who own environmentally and climate-damaging industries and the rest of the population.
Why is this dimension so important to me? The way I see it, those who own environmentally and climate-damaging industries have a profit interest in averting the socio-ecological transition.
For example, a study from 2022 shows us what would happen if a climate policy that meets the Paris climate targets were effectively implemented. Investors – the majority of them private individuals in OECD countries – would lose around 1 trillion dollars. Why? Because they have invested in oil and gas extraction. These are investments that would become stranded assets in the event of an effective climate policy.
Other studies estimate losses much higher – 4 trillion, 17 trillion – and this is just the fossil fuel sector for now – not the auto industry, or aviation, and other industries that rely on fossil fuels to realize their own profits.
Investors in all these sectors have an interest – indeed, a class interest – in ensuring that effective climate policy is not implemented. And to prevent this from happening, they try to influence politics and society.
On the one hand, they do this through lobbying and corruption, which are now well documented. On the other hand, they do this by influencing social debates.
According to a 2020 study, the “discourses of delay” are particularly popular. This is not a denial of climate change, but rather statements – on television, in social media, in daily newspapers, in political consultation documents – that either justify inaction or promote inadequate climate protection measures.
Typical discourses of postponement are as follows:
- “Climate protection starts with each individual. Consumers, not politicians, must protect the environment.” Or else
- “No radical change is needed. Technological progress will solve the problem. Don’t be so pessimistic.” Or else
- “It’s already too late anyway.” Or else
- “Climate change is being made in China!” Or else
- “Climate protection is an elite issue. The average citizen has other problems”. Or again
- “If we stop using fossil fuels, then prosperity will come to an end. You have to make a choice: Either prosperity or climate.”
I list this because I believe it gives us further insights into the socio-ecological class conflict. As Matthias Schmelzer and his colleagues also write in their book: socio-ecological mentality types are not target groups that “just are” and will remain that way. Rather, both classes and their mentalities are the product of social processes – processes that vested interests seek to manipulate.
The polluters’ lobby loves it when we disagree on the socio-ecological transtion. When some recognize climate as the most important issue of our time and others spurn it as an “elite fetish”. When elites are not seen as “the rich”, but as “the oat milk drinkers”. As long as we argue, they can continue to make profits.
The polluters’ lobby also finds it’s great when a broad mass of people still firmly believe that the problem can only be solved technologically – if not now then at some point, even if it’s already too late. It helps them when those who speak out in favour of prompt technological and social change are ridiculed or criminalized.
To make a long story short: Our socio-ecological class conflict suits those who profit from business as usual, and is fueled by them.
Is this a conspiracy theory? No, because it is now well established that and how companies influence politics and public debates (see e.g. here & here). Yale sociologist Justin Farrell, for example, has used a broad data analysis to show how social organizations sponsored by corporations (such as ExxonMobil & Koch Industries) are much more likely to drive polarizing discourse on climate change than those that are not sponsored.
If one takes such insights into consideration, then class conflict for socio-ecological change is not something that simply is, but something that has been and continues to be actively produced.
By this I do not mean that socio-ecological change does not in and of itself harbor conflicts of interest that need to be negotiated. There is no question that such conflicts of interest exist. But where exactly the lines of conflict lie is something that can, and in my opinion must, change.
How should this be done?
One thing that we – sociologists, cultural scientists, political scientists – perhaps still think too little about is how class consciousness and class interests can be changed.
Some would say that such a project is tantamount to political manipulation or propaganda, but I see it differently. The way I see it, politics is always about actively defining class interests and class conflicts.
My inspiration for this kind of thinking comes from the British sociologist and cultural scientist Stuart Hall. In the 1980s, he wondered why Margret Thatcher’s policies found favor even among people who were disadvantaged by these policies – for example through austerity measures or the dismantling of workers’ rights. Hall concludes that while there are materially defined class interests – workers want more income, entrepreneurs want cheap labor, and so on – the story doesn’t end there.
What politics does is that it takes up interests and binds them to political projects. This creates a narrative, an ideology, a network of interlinked beliefs, such as: Growth creates prosperity. Security equals black zero. Environmental protection means sacrifice. Climate is an elite issue, and so on.
I think that postgrowth thinking can inspire an effective alternative narrative here, a kind of counter-ideology. And I don’t mean ideology in a negative sense here. As a cultural theorist, I know that we humans cannot do without meaningful networks of ideas.
Postgrowth thinking could make it possible to take up existing class interests and politically redefine them. Prosperity could mean: plenty of free time and unconditional access to housing, education and healthcare. Elite could mean: Billionaires whose wealth is so excessive that it needs to be redistributed. Security could mean: strengthening community and averting a climate catastrophe.
Ultimately, of course, it is not only a different way of thinking that is needed, but also different institutions. Rethinking and restructuring are interlinked. The more we rethink, the more we are prepared to restructure, and the more we restructure, the more we are able to rethink.
However, we need someone who will specifically tackle this rethinking and restructuring, and I don’t think we have that yet. We have an international postgrowth movement, yes. And we have social movements that are allied with it.
I am convinced that we need more than that. A political party, for example, that actively develops postgrowth concepts and links them to the interests of various classes. (The party does not have to call itself a postgrowth party)
What is important here is that such a party not only tries to serve existing class-interests, but that it reinterprets interests in cooperation with citizens. In this context, reinterpretation does not mean: teaching people better, but rather looking at how the interests of different social groups could be understood differently and satisfied differently – ideally better – on the basis of postgrowth principles.
It also means seizing on the frustration that is currently fuelling far-right movements and mobilizing it for a more just political project. Because this frustration does not come from nowhere. Even in rich industrialized nations, there are grievances. Extreme inequality, for example. The fact that 10 percent of Germans own 61 percent of total wealth, while 30 percent either have zero wealth or are even in debt. The fact that affordable housing is in short supply.
In my own research, I look at the wishes and aspirations of the middle classes in rich countries. What do these middle classes lack? Why are they sometimes frustrated – even if they often have more than enough materially?
What they lack is: free time, sleep, moments of concentration, the feeling of creating something useful in their jobs. Security for the future. Connection to the environment. Community. What Hartmut Rosa calls “resonance”.
These are just a few examples, and many of these wishes could be perfectly combined with a postgrowth project. At present, however, postgrowth is seen as a nightmare for the middle classes of rich countries, because it is they who would have to reduce their consumption under postgrowth principles and put their interests second.
We must learn to understand these interests better and then emphasize precisely the dimensions of those interests that fit in with a postgrowth project.
And, of course, this doesn’t just apply to the middle classes, but to all social groups that should be on board with postgrowth.
Stuart Hall calls such an approach “politics as a production”. What resonates here is that counter-hegemonic politics is hard work. I am grateful that Matthias Schmelzer has dedicated himself to such work and hope that we can continue to advance postgrowth politics together.
